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PREFACE 
While often overshadowed by faculty research, the efforts 
of students should not be overlooked, and this journal hopefully 
will encourage scholarly research by students and provide a means 
by which their efforts will be recognized. Phi Alpha Theta is 
greatly indebted to the History Department of Western Kentucky 
University headed by Dr. Richard Troutman. We are grateful to 
our Consulting Editors, Dr. Charles Bussey, Dr. Carol Crowe 
Carraco, and Dr. David Lee, for their assistance in this project. 
We also thank the Student Editorial Committee consisting of 
Mark Lega, Alan Lescallet, and Terry Tatum. A special thanks 
goes to Mr . Tom Foster for designing our cover. For her tireless 
and exacting effort Phi Alpha Theta thanks our typist, Ms. 
Medora Ann Woodward. Our most profound debt of gratitude goes 
to the contributing writers--those who were published and those 
who were not--that constitute a group which forms the heart of 
any publication. 
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THE WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE MOVE~IENT: 
1870 - 1900 
" ,no race oj men call I'ise above their mothers, The sufJrage 
movemellt is an effort to elevate the entire race by elevati ng its 
womanhood. " 
Nellie Nugent Somerville, 
President of tIle Mississippi 
Suffrage Association 
II feminism is defilled as tIle belief thaL women are human 
beings and entitled to tIle same opportunities for sell-expression 
a" men, then America has sheltel'ed a feminist bias from the begin-
ninK, In both tIle eighteenth and nineteenth centuries foreign 
travclel's l't'marked on the freedom given to women in America, "A 
p:l1'adisp J01' women," on(> eighteenth-century German called Amel'ica, 
and towar d the close of the nin eteenth century Lord Bryce wrote 
that in the Ulllted SLates "it is easiel' fOl' women La find a career, 
to obtain wor k oj an intell(>ctual as of a commercial kind, than in 
any paJ'l of Europ(', "1 
C'rtalllly thL 
exp lain lhis feminist ULI", , 111 <l :,ul..l.l..Ly U"lll!4 :,"aped out 01 a 
.ilderness, women were active and important contributors to the 
process of seltlement and civ i lization, In addition, because women 
have been scarce in America they have been highly valued, During 
almost the whole of th e colonial period men outnumbered women, and 
even in the nineteenth century women remained scarce in the west, 
For example, 3S late as 1865 there were three men for each woman 
in California; in Colorado the ratio was as high as 20 to I, Such 
diflerences in the sex ratio undoubtedly account for lhe West's 
favorable attitude toward women as in an Oregon law of 1850 that 
grunted land to single women and, eve n more significant Jar the 
time, to married women; or in the willingness for Western territories 
like Wyoming (1869) and Utah (1870) to grant the suffrage to women 
long before other regions where the sex ratio was more nearly 
equal,2 
But if the irontier experience of America helped to create 
a vague feminist bias that granted women more privileges than in 
settled Europe, the really powerful force changing women's place 
h ad little to do with the frontier or the newness of the country, 
It was the industrial revolution that provided the stimulus to 
women ' s hopes for equality of opportunity, encouraging the first 
stage in the changing position of women--the removal of legal and 
customary barriers to women ' s full participation in the activities 
of the world,3 
Judy Bussell 
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Women, of course, have always had a role in the economic pro-
ductivity of the naLion. Before Lhe coming of the machine they 
worked in tlleir homes to produce the food and clothing which tlleir 
families needed, and they reared the children, nursed the sick And 
took care 01 Lhe aged. Farm wives Ilelped in Lhe fields and bal'ns, 
and trademen's wives were olten lound in the family shop. But as 
the country became more indusLrialized many home Lasks were Laken 
over by commercial enterprise. Mass production made iL easier Dnd 
oIten cheaper to purchase the family's greatest needs in the form 
of processed foods and manufactured goods. Because the new factory 
system needed workers, women and even children were encouraged to 
seek employment. 4 
Today it is universally recogni~ed that men work ouLside the 
home. But before the industrial revolution 01 the nineteenth 
century, the great majority of men and women wel'e co-workers on 
the land and in the home. The coming of machine production 
changed all Lhat. For a time, it is Lrue, many unmarried women 
and children--the surplus labor of the day--were the principal 
support of the new factory system, but only temporarily. By the 
middle of the nineteenth cenLury the bulk of industrial labor was 
male. The comiug of tile factory and the city thus wholly changed 
the nature of men's work. For the first lime in history, work 
for most men was something done outside the lamily, psychologically 
as well as physically separated from the home. 5 
The same industrial process that separated work and home also 
provided the opportunities for women to 101low men out of the home. 
For that reason the feminist movement, botb socially and intellect-
ually, was a direct result of tile industrial changes of the nineteenth 
century. Furthermore, just as the new industrial system was 
reshaping the rural men who came under its influence, so it reshaped 
the nature of women. 6 
The process began with the home, which, in the early years 01 
industrialization, was still the siLe of most women's work. Because 
of high land values, the city home was smaller than the farm house, 
and with less work for Children, the size of the ul'ban tamily was 
sma ller than the rur81. MoreOVel", work in the urba n home cha nged, 
Machines in factories now performed many of the tasks that had 
long been women's. In truth, the feminist movement began not 
when women felt a desire fOl' men's jobs, but when men in factories 
began to take away women's traditional work. Factory-produced 
clothing, commercial laundries, prepared foods (e.g. prepared 
cereals, canned vegetables, condensed milk, bakery bread) were 
already available in the years afLer the Civil War. Toward the 
end of the century an advanced feminist like Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman, impressed by the increasing departure of women's chores 
from the middle-class home, predicted that the Whole kitchen would 
soon be gone,7 
The most direct way in which industrialization altered the 
social function of WOmen was by providing work for women outside 
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lhe home. Production by machine, 01 course, widened enormously 
the uses to which women's lobor could be put once physical 
stl'ength was no 1011ger a consideraLion. And toward the end of 
the century, as business enterprises grew and record-keeping, 
communicalions aud public relations expanded, new opportunities 
for women opened up in business offices. The telephone operator, 
the typist, the clerieol worker and the stenogl'apher now took 
places beside Lhe seamstress, the cotton mill operator and the 
teacher. 8 
As workers outside Lhe home, women buried the Victorian 
stereotype of the lady under a mountain of reality.9 After all, 
it was diflicult to argue that women as a sex were weak, timid, 
incompetent, 1ragile vessels 01 spirituality when thousands of 
them could be seen trudging to work in the early hours of the 
day in ony city of the nation. 10 
Feminists, such as Lucretia Mott and Elizobeth Cady Stanton, 
who galhered at Seneca Falls, New York in 1848 for Lbe f irst women's 
convenlion, were lar removed from the mainstream of American life. ll 
Many hod participaLed in the abolitionist struggle, demonstrating 
by thejl' actions there the extent to which they deviated from 
prevailing norms o[ lemale behavior. Attacking the tradition that 
men and womBl1 should occupy totally separate spheres of activity, 
Lhey demallded a drastic revision of the values and laws governing 
relationshjps between tile sexes, and immediately launched an 
assault on all forms of discrimination. Their efforts were greeted 
with ridicule and contempt. Th e Worchester Telegram denounced 
t.he Seneca Falls Convention as an attempt at llinsurrection," and 
a Buffalo paper referred to it as "revolutionary." Women's rights 
advocates were generally dismissed as a "class of wild enthusiasts 
and visionaries" and received little popular backing. 12 
The ear ly feminists took an uncompromising stand on almost 
all issues and set out. to e liminate the rigid division of labor 
between men and women. SUffrage constituted only one of a long 
series of demands, 13 
The radical nature of the ear ly feminist movement was revealed 
in the Declaration of Sentiments and Resolution s passed by the 
women at Seneca FoIls, In the nineteenth century, females were 
not. allowed to testify in court, hold title to property, establi sh 
businesses, 01' sign papers as witnesses, Beginning with the 
assertion that "all men and women are created equal, " the 
Declaration proceeded to indict mankind for its "history of 
repeated injuries and usurpations" toward women, The delegates 
charged that men had denied them political representation, made 
them "civilly dead," refused them the right to own their own 
property, an d "oppressed them on all sides," Hardly an area 
existed, the feminists concluded , where man had not consciously 
endeavored to "destroy woman ' s confidence in her own powers, 
to lessen her self-respect, and to make her willing to lead a 
dependent and abject life."14 
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To counter the oppression which they observed, women's l'il!;hts 
leaders proposed the elimination of all barriers separatinl!; the 
activities 01 the two sexes. Henceforth, they declared, any law 
which restricted woman's freedom or placed her in a position 
inferior to men had "no force or authol'ity." Proclaiming' the 
"identity of the race in capabilities and responsibilities," 
they demanded the "overthrow of the monopoly of tile pulpil," 
equal access to education, the trades, and professions, an end 
to the double standard, and tile right to move in "tile enlarged 
spilere" which their Cl'ea tOl' had assigned them . God had made men 
and women equal, the femillists asserted, and the Lreatment of 
one sex as different from and less equal than the other ran 
"contrary to the grea t precept 0 r natu1'e, "15 
For much of the remainder of the nineteenth century, women's 
rights leaders continued to press for sweeping social change, The 
Suffrage became a more prominent issue aCtel' Congress failed to 
recognize women's right to vote in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, but many feminists persisted in tracing female inequD 1-
ity to the sexual division of labor in society and warned agaillst 
thinking of the franchise as a cure-all , Speaking through a 
journal entitled The Revolution, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a founder 
of the women's rights movement, dismissed the surrl'age as a 
"superficial and fragmentary" question, "The ballot touches only 
those interests, either of men and women, which take their roots 
in political questions," Stanton and her followers declared in 
1869. "But woman's chief discontent is not with Ilel' political, 
but with her social, and particularly her marital bondage,"16 
Stanton and her allies attacked economic discrimination, urged 
reform of the divorce laws, and in Lile ]890 ' s organized a monumental 
effort to write a Woman ' s Bible to counteract the widespread 
theological assumpt10n that females were the weak and inierior 
sex . Perhaps the most significant figure in the woman's movcment 
during the nineteenth century, Stanton supported acquisition of 
the vote as a partial step toward achieving freedom, but her 
broader aim remained "to make woman a self-supporting equal partner 
with man in the staLe, the Church and the home.,,17 
This radical persuasion received its most thorough definition 
at the turn of the century in the works of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, 
A 1 though Gilman wrote primarily f01' a twentieth-century audience, 
she articulated more brilliantly than anyone else the pOint of 
view held by many of the founders of feminism. A writer and 
lecturer who had been through an unhappy early marriage. Gilman 
approached her SUbject with the same disaffecLion 1'ronl traditional 
mores which characterized the women in Seneca Falls and elaborated 
the sentiments expressed there into a social and economic analySiS, 
Her treatise on Women and Economics (1898) was hailed by the 
Nation as "the most signIficant utterance on the subject since 
MillIs The Subjection of Women," and her wl'itings to this day 
constitut:e the most 1mporLant feminist asse~sment of women's 
position in America,18 
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At the heart 01 Gilman's annlysis wns her conLention thaL all 
the roles n female was permitted Lo play derived from her sexual 
lunetions. A man migll! pursue a variety of aetivities--build a 
cal'eel', ellt(>r politics, join a fraLernal organization. But a 
woman eould only marry and have cllildren. In effect. sex became 
a female's ee-onomic way of lile: while "men worked to live. 
wom<'n mated Lo live. "" man might. conquer Lhe wOl'ld in a 
hundred ways, but lor a woman Lhere was only "a single channel, 
a single' cholet WenlLh, power, so(;ial distinction. iame. 
all, must comc' to her thl'ou!{h a small gold 1'ing."19 
Woman's human impulses to grow and to create werc stilled. 
Men were deni0d L,'uc companions because their wives shared not.hing 
in common with them. And children were psychologically deprived 
as a I'CSU] t. o[ being domina ted by mothers who had never been 
allowed to gl'OW Lo menial maturit.y. A nation which expected to 
maximize Lile potential 01 all its citizens depended upon each 
individual pursuing his 01' he,' talents. Yet. social convention 
die-tated thaL 11011 the race perform noLhing but menial household 
tasks. The sexual division of labor thus not. only dulled women's 
minds and limited their horizons; it also robbed the country of 
the full utilization 01 its human resources. 20 
Gilman concluded that women could achieve freedom only when 
they gain0d economic equaliLy wiLh men. The suffrage represent.ed 
one sLep in lhe right direction and received Gilman's endorsement. 
Work, Gilman believed, was "the essential process of human life." 
and ulltil women shared in that process on an equal basis with men, 
Lhey would remain "near-sighted, near-minded," and inferior. 21 
To achieve her goal, Gilman relied primarily on the power of 
reason and tlw forces of specialization which were changing the 
notional economy. The home, she argued, was frightfully inefficient. 
Women were no more suited or contented to be "house servants and 
house keepers than all men would be." The talents of some women 
qunlified them to be specialists in cooking, cleaning, or child 
care. But the talents 01 others could be best utilized outside 
the home in bUSi ness ::Ind the professions. With most women libel'-
ated from domestic chores, marriage would evolve into a partnership 
of equals; individual human beings would maximize their diverse 
abilities, and societ.y would be free of the crippling effect.s of 
a dual system of labor. The result "would be a world of men and 
women humanly relaLed, as well as sexually related, working 
together as they wel'e meant to do, for the common good of all. .. 22 
Despite its brilliance, Gilman ' s analysis W::lS weak in several 
areas. She neglect.ed to mention the depersonalization wh ich might 
acCOmpallY institutionalized child care and food preparation, and 
she failed to see that the nuclear family might have positive as 
well as negaLive attributes. More important, she ass um ed that 
even after women had adopted a life style closer to that of men and 
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had become equal partners in the quest for jobs and status. they 
would continue to exhibit primarily the domestic virtues of warmlh 
and nurture--a desirable goal, perhaps, but a logical inconsistency 
considerillg her previous contention that male and female differences 
were basically a product of contrasting environmental conditioning. 
Nevertheless, Gilman's arguments represented the full elaboration 
of the feminist impulse. More than anyone else, she ullderstood 
the social implications of the doctrines articulated at Seneca 
Falls. 23 
Long befol'e Gilman's views drew Pllblic attolltion, Ilowevel', it 
was clear that the changes which she and StanLon advocated bad 
little chance of being accepted. In criticlzing the nuclear family, 
marriage, and the church, feminists like Gilman were attacking 
institutions to which most people were deeply devoted. Woman's 
place could not be changed wiLhout altering the family and forcing 
a radical revision of a whol~ set of social relationships. Yet 
most Americans reacted to such a prospect with understandable 
hostility. 'fhe idea of woman's "sphere" was one of tile COI'ller-
stones of society.24 
The feminists did not help their cause when they allowed 
themselves to be identified with proposals to liberalize sexual 
morality. In the 1870's Victoria Woodhull, a friend of Susan B. 
Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, endorsed free love and licensed 
prostitution in her weekly newspaper. Advocacy of sexual freedom 
was bad enough. but Woodhull tben went on to create a public 
uproar by charging that the respectable reformer Henry Ward 
Beecher was having a love affair with Elizabeth TilLon. Beecher 
instituted a libel suit, prolonging the public uproar, and 
prominent feminists rushed to 1V00dhull's defense. Horace Greely. 
among otller-s, had previously stated that 11e could not support the 
feminists because they were too closely tied to the C8use of free 
love. Now, Woodhull's declarations, and her widely publicized 
association with feminists, appeared to confirm Greely's allegations, 
and added one more weapon to the anti-feminist arsenal. 25 
Such episodes inevitably took their toll. As the century 
wore on, it became increaSingly obvious that if the woman's 
movement continued to advocate serious change in mal'l"iage and 
the family, it would be dismissed as a radical group and charged 
with trying to destroy the moral fiber of the nation. 26 
In the woman's movement, the forces of compromise gradually 
gained increased strength. The years aiter the Civil War saw 
feminism divided into different camps--the "conservativc" American 
Woman's Suffrage Association, which was concerned almost exclusively 
with winning the ballot, and the "liberal" National Woman's 
Suffrage Association, which was committed to more f~r-reaching 
institutional change. By the end of the century, the degree of 
opposition to more radical feminist demands had made the liberal 
position defenseless, and in 1890 the two wings of the movement 
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rcuni ted as lhc Na Lional American Woman's Suffl'age Associalion 
(NA WSA) concel'ned primal'i I y wi Lh lhe goa I 01 wi nni ng the suf frage--
Lile most respectable and limited feminist demand,27 
At the same time, women's-rights leaders s hif ted from an 
"al'gument from ,justice" to an "argument from expediency ," Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton, at various times, had used the cxpediency argument, 
and later women ' s-rights advocates never abandoned the argument 
from justice, But by the turn of the century there was a s hift 
in thc balancc betwcen the two positions, Instea d 01 emphasi zing 
the inalienablc l'igl1ts 01 Jemales as individuals, the feminists 
Lended to emphasize th e utility of the ballot as an agent for 
refol'ming society , And ratllcr than base th e ir appeal on the 
similarity of mCll and women as human beings, they underlined the 
ullcl13ngeable differences which disLinguished the sexes and gave 
to eac h a uniqueness in politics,28 
The positions the suffragis ts took on such issues as immigra-
tion, race, and religion l'cflccted th e extent to which they shared 
prevailing pu blic opinion, In 1894 Carrie Chapman Catt joined 
thos e protesting Lhe influx of foreigners and warn e d against the 
effort of undesirables to l'avage the na tion' s wealth, "There is 
buL one way to averl dangel'," Mrs, Ca lt declared: "Cut off the 
vole of the sl um s and give it to women, , , ,,,29 A year earlier 
t.he suffJ'age convention had blatantly appealed to nativist fears 
by cal lin g attention to th e fact that "ther e are more white women 
who ca n l'ead and wri t e than all ncgro voters; more Ame rican women 
who can read and write than all foreign vot. ers, " Woman suffrage, 
th e convention suggested, "would settle th e vexed question of rul e 
by illiteracy" and e nsure the perpetuation of the Am e rican way 
of life,JO 
Wit.h the advent of Progressivism, th e stra tegy of consensus 
bore fruit, Th e suffragists had already def ine d the vote for 
wome n as a means of humanizing government, and in a period of 
generalized commitment to "reform," they wel'e able to identify 
t.ll e ir own cause with the larger effort to e xtend democracy and 
eliminat e socia l injustice , Progress ivism mea nt a great many 
thin gs to dill e r e nt. people, but in large part it r e presented an 
effort to clean up th e most. obvious causes of corruption, disease, 
and poverty , Within such D context, the suffrag ists argued con-
vincingly that extension of the franchise to females would help in 
th e task of improving society, To a remarkabl e extent, the 
society at large d ef ine d the goals of Progressivism in the same 
way, and as a result, the suffragists succeeded in making the 
vot e for women a promin e nt item on the agenda of reform,31 
Female r eformers , of course, played a d eC isive part in shaping 
ProgreSS ivis m through their involveme nt in the social welfare move-
me n t., Women like Ja ne Addams , Lillia n Wa Id, a nd Florence Kelley 
st.art e d the settlement houses which sprouted up in urban America 
during the 1890's. and then carried their ideas and experience 
into naLional organizations dedicated to securing legislative 
change. For such women, suffrage and the cause 01 social welfare 
wet'e 10rever tied together. Committed to building better neighbor-
hoods and improving the conditions 01 workers in sweatshops and 
factories. tlley realized that tbey could accomplish little wltllout 
political power. Woman SUffrage thus became a natural concern 
of reformers 11'110 boped to mo~ilize an independent poliLical con-
stituency which would 10rce party bosses into acLion. The vote 
Cor females, tile reformers believed, would add a sympathetic bloc 
to the electorate and provide the leverage necessary to secure 
social-welfare legislation. 32 
Progressivism also provided a vehicle by which millions oj 
hiLherto uninvolved middle-class women became politicized. During 
the years between 1895 and 1915, Robert Wilbe has written. almost 
every established gro\lp wi thin the npw middle-class "experienced 
its formative growth toward self-consciousness.,,:l:1 
A look at progressivism in the Southern suffrage movement of 
the nineteenth century is notewoltllY because ill the SouLh the 
image of the lady took deep l'OOt and had far-reaching social 
consequences. The social role of women was unusually ronfilling 
there. One result was that southern women became in Lime a 
distinct type among American women. Rnother was lhat their 
effol·ts to free themselves were more complex than those 01 womell 
elsewhel'e. 34 
"She wants the vote to use as a lever, and so do I," said 
the heroine of a Virgillia novel, "but behind it all. .. J am 
fighting for plain recognition 01 an equal humanity. ,,35 A 
Kentucky suffragist wrote, 
There are many women in tile South gifted with genius 
and endowed with faculties for glorious work. who are 
struggling to free themselves from the austerity oJ 
those environments which 'the masses of average men' 
have fixed for them.:l 6 
Suffrage more than any other aspect 01 the feminist movement 
became the symbol of women's emancipation. Partly this was 
because, historically. voting had been associated with the idea 
of equal rights, partly because it was a general goal uP9n which 
women witll many different specific purposes could agree. J7 
To its opponents as well, "woman suffrage" meant more than 
women voting. The thrust 01 tile nineteenth century had been 
toward a broader franchise. But for every suffragist who linked 
the vote to her humanity. there were men (and also women) who 
equated ballots for females with a terrifying threat to society.38 
In 1909 one Robert Holland summ~d up male fears in an article in 
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the Sewanee Review. Society forbade suffrage to women, Holland 
asserted. Female honor. he argued, was incompatible with voting. 
"Her finer being has thus far refined Society by keeping out of 
its turmoil." Unless the unseemly demand for "rights" ceased, 
he predicted. women would gradua lly grow ugly and coarse. Strife 
would characterize family life, and in the end there would be 
utter disaster. since "the first principle of religion is obedience. 
The woman who does not obey her husband will not obey God who 
enjoins her submission.,,39 
Men were not alone in opposing suffrage in the South. Sub-
stantial numbers of southern women were slow to see any advantage 
to themselves and were afraid to believe in something which dis-
pleased men. One woman wrote, "Every southern woman has a 
protection and champion in every southern man." Two decades 
later another wrote that southern women did not want the vote 
because they wanted "to preserve in their daughters the salient 
characteristics of a past generat ion." Giving women the vote, 
she said, would lead to divisions and dissensions in the home. 
hitherto "the source of all good in the state." The glory of 
womanhood has been "her purity, her superiority to man in the 
possession of a high e r moral sense and standard. Why risk this 
precious certainty for a doubtful good?,,40 
The Sout h was slow to develop an organized suffrage movement. 
In 1848 the women who met at Seneca Falls had included the right 
to vote in their list of demands. Because many of the early 
suffragists were abolitionists, the idea of woman 's rights was 
a curse in the South.41 
Signs of suffrage sentiment appeared here and there in the 
South in the first decade after the war. In 1869 suffrage 
resolutions were presented to constitutional conventions in Texas 
and Arkansas. A woman's rights convention was held in Columbia, 
South Carolina, in 1870 with the blessing of the Reconstruction 
government. In 1876 a Mississippi woman addressed the Democratic 
Convention, assembled in Nashville, in behalf of woman suffrage. 42 
These flur ri es of suffrage sentiment did not represent a 
large body of opinion. A report from Alabama in the third 
volume of the History of Woman Suffrage, published in 1886 , 
noted that women there were "awake on the temperance question" 
but unprepared for suffrage. As late as 1897 a national organizer 
traveling in Mississippi wrote bitterly that suffrage was often 
seen as a "heresy that has a real devil in it." and that "death 
and education have much to do in this southland. "43 
Through the seventies and eighties, however , a few tireless 
women kept the fires alive. In Kentucky the four Clay sisters--
Mary, Anne, Sallie, and Laura--were virtually a suffrage organization 
in themselves. In Tennessee, Elizabeth Avery Meriwether, descr ibed 
as "the c hie f representative of libera l thought in Tennessee," 
was a hardy soul who had survived a diificult period as a war 
refugee and had returned to ~lemphis aItel' the wal' to establish 
and edit lJer own newspaper, calleel The Tablet,4~1 
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These early suffragists did not need a "movement" La bring 
them to the cause. Two things they had in common: a strong sense 
of their own capacities and the ability to be sell-starting, 
Some of them lJad begun to show maverick tendencies before the war. 
Those who were old enough had faced the war itself with independence 
and courage and a£tel'lvard were prepared for the )'idicule and se01'I1 
often direc ted at "stl'ong-minded" WOltlen, Indeed, SOllie of them 
seemed to gain positive satisfaction from being different; involve-
ment in the suffrage struggle gave them an independence and an 
identity which they found llIuch to their liking,ij5 
Suffrage organizations did noL limit themselves to the single 
cause of the ballot, The record shows southern suffragists to 
have been engaged in a wide val'iety of reform efforts, The New 
Orleans Equal Rights Association, for example, took tile lead 
first in the anti-lottery campaign and then in securing modern 
sewage and drainage and a pure water supply, In addition to their 
concern Jor temperance, child labor, and the working conditions 
of women, suffrage groups worked for women's colleges, Jar laws 
which would permi t women to serve on school boards, lor tuberculosis 
control, for prenatal clinics, and for modificaLion in the age 
of consent,46 
Despite its significance in training numbers of women in 
politics, despite the symbolism that it developed for women in 
search of a new life-style, the organized e~fort to attain woman 
SUffrage was less effective in the South than in almost any other 
part of tbe country, When the Nineteenth Amendment passed the 
Congress and was sent to the states for ratification, only Texas, 
Tennessee, Kentucky, and Arkansas among southern states voted to 
accept it, Women mounted vigorous campaigns in all the other 
states, but were defeated, They wasted little time in regret. 
They accepted suffrage as a gift fl'om fellow citizens outside 
the South and went promptly to work to give meaning to the new-
found right,47 
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RFK AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
"1961: IT HAD ONLY JUST BEGUN" 
Some men sec things as they are and say why. 
I dream things that never were and say why not. 
16 
When Robert Kennedy became Attorney General 01 the United 
States in January, 1961, he was not well acquainted with the wants 
and needs of American Negroes. But Kennedy, "a man of constan t 
growth and Change, "1 soon developed an acute sensi tivi ty oj the 
need for improved civil rights and dedicated much oj his rem;}in-
ing ye;}rs to that goal. The manncr in which he npproached tile 
issue from 1961 until his death in 1968 is of great significance. 
Instead of agonizing over why the country had reached such a 
crucial level, he concerned himself with developing and initiating 
new ideas and programs to alleviate existing situations. Although 
considered ruthless, unyielding and insensitive al limes, Robcrt 
Kennedy came to be the embodiment 01 the phrase he lre![ucnlly 
borrowed from George Bel'nard Shaw: "Some men see things as 
they are and say why. I dream things that never were and say 
why not." Consequently this direction of thinking was to oIfcl' 
hope and encouragement Jor both blacks and wh1 tes in this ('ountry. 
A foundation for this approach appears in KennC'dy's Iil'sl 
public address on the issue of civil rights. After scrving as 
Attorney General for only three months, the 35-year-Old ~assachusctts 
native accepted an invitation to address the Honol"s Day con-
vocation at the University of Georgia Law School in Athens, 
Georgia. His "blueprint for civil l'igh Ls," as TllOmas Hopkins 
appropriately named it, also was his first formal address on any 
subject since becoming Attorney General . With the aide of his 
speech writers, Kennedy prepared lor almost two months prior to 
the speaking engagement on May 6, 1961, and according to Hopkins, 
"they could take satisfaction in a job well dOlle,"2 
It now seems important to ask whether or not Kennedy's 
speech was as effective as it was well-prepared. Racial dis-
crimination towards black Americans has been pervasive ever since 
the first slaves were brought to this country in tile early 1600's. 
Through the years, countless men have championed the cause, but 
why is it that only a certain Iew are remembered"? Three reasons 
come to mind: 1) They were a "first" in one way or another; 
2) They said "the right thing in the right way at the right time 
and place"; and 3) Their efforts resulted in positive action. 
An application of these factors to Kennedy's civil l"ights address 
sheds insight on his success and his "visionary approach" to the 
problem which makes him long remembered. 
Beverly Davenport 
Let us turn to Lhe speech itself to note the materials and 
methods he employed to accomplish his purpose. Although it was 
customary in the early 1960's to cond emn segregation in t h e 
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North, Kennedy was the first high ranking governmenta l official 
to do so in the South . 3 It seems evident that this fact alone 
would have a definite effect on Lhe audience. The "touchy 
subject" of civil rights, as it was described in a Newsweek 
magazin e article, was one of the most salien t issues of the time. 4 
It was even more salient to the peop le o f Athens, Ge orgia, than 
to those in other parts 01 tile country. Only lour months prior 
to Kennedy's address, nearly 600 University of Georgia students 
participaLed in riaLs and demonstrations because Negro students 
Charlayne Hunter and Hamilton Holmes were allowed matriculation 
a t the school. The two were sus pended for "their own sa fety "5 
following the demonstrations but were later allowed to return 
and finally graduate in June, 1963. They were the first blacks 
to achi eve such a distinction at the Univ e rsity of Ge orgia. 
With these event s still fresh in th e audience's mind, Ke nn e dy 
had the monumental task of presenting his ideas in an acceptable 
manner to a somewhat hostile audience. But in his words, "to 
have chosen any other subject would have been hypocr itical. "6 
It seems in evitable that such a c ontroversial s ubj ec t would be 
met with opposition. Shortly before he arrive d, the police 
arrested live fundamenta~ist ministers who we r e picket ing with 
signs that read, "Th e Bibl e tea c hes separation." During the 
ni g ht young boys had painted the sidewalks with "Yankee go home," 
but th is was washed off before Ke nn e dy arrived th e next morning. 
According to Th e New York Times, Georgia politicians "were 
notable by t heir absence," because they heard Kenn e dy would talk 
about civil rights . 7 
Here was a high ra nking govern ment officia 1 advoca ting c i vi 1 
rights r eform before an overwhelmingly southern white audience 
who had witnessed demonstrations only months before. This 
encounter was truly a first. With the issues of civil rights 
c oming to the forefront in almost all areas of the country today, 
such an e nd ea vor might seem inSignificant. But Kennedy's remarks 
came on the eve of what later turned out to be a moral revolution . 
At the early, most crucial stages, almost all remarks were 
temper e d with restraint. Few were quite so bold quite so early 
in quite the same situat ion. 
Organi zation played a vital role in the success of Kennedy's 
speech. In th e introduction, he us e d the common ground approach 
with an added bit of humor to capture the audience's attention. 
Aft e r congratulating the honor students, Kennedy related a 
personal experience of award winning. He said he was named the 
student with the fifth best sense of humor in his graduating 
class from the University of Virginia Law School. This, according 
to Ja y Cox, "eased a lot of tension.,,8 Cox was president of the 
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Advisory Council of the Law School who had visited Kennedy carly 
in March and had asked him to speak. This off-the-cuff remark 
did not appear in the formal text but did contribute to the 
overall effect. He lIsed another conunon ground approach to open 
his formal text. Talking of his recent presentation of the 
Young American Medal for Bravery to Donald McGregor, Kennedy 
complimented him as "one of a long line of Georgians who have by 
their courage set an outstanding example for theil' fellow 
Americans."g He followed this with a note of humor by saying 
that he could not find any kinfolk in Georgia, a task which 
many called a prerequisite to speaking there. This tOllch of 
humor and regional intel'est may. as Cox observed, have helped 
ease the tension and make the audience more receptlve to further 
comments. Briefly he addressed two areas of major concern which 
fell under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department: organized 
crime and "illegal practices by the amateurs." He touched upon 
these only lightly. They merely served as a warm-up to the 
third al'ea "that affects us all the most directly--civil rights ... 10 
The remainder of the speech was addressed to civil rights which 
comprised nearly two-thirds of the entire presenta tion. Althougll 
an emotional subject, Kennedy wisely chose Dot to use emotional 
appeals. Instead he turned to logic in his quest for gaining 
acceptance and adherence to his philosophy. '~ob recognized the 
need for dramatic manifestations of civil rigbts work but also 
the need for a very basic and pragmatic approach to the political 
problem in vol ved," sa id John Seigentlla ler. Kennedy campa ign a ide 
and now editor of the Nashville Tennessean. 11 The young Attorney 
General explained the C1Vl1 rlghts issue as a matter oj law, and 
be emphasized the preeminence of law in a democracy. By presenting 
tbis enthymeme, he expected his audience to infer that abiding by 
civil rights decisions was imperative for the continuation of a 
democracy. He quoted his brother by saying "law is the strongest 
link between man and freedom." "Respect for the law." he said, 
"is the meaning of Law Day, and every day must be Law Day or else 
our society will collapse.,,12 He continued this line of reason-
ing by saying "I happen to believe that the 1954 (Supreme Court) 
decision was right. But my belief does not matter--it is the 
law. Some of you may believe the decision was wrong. That does 
not matter. It is the law. And we both respect tl1e law. ,,13 
Speaking to an audience of 1,600 alumni and students of the 
University of Georgia Law School, Kennedy was appealing to their 
sense of values and respect for the law. 
Anotber important psychological factor was Kennedy's appeal 
to the needs of the audience. In case of further demonstrations 
and riots, Georgians and other Americans needed to know how the 
Justice Department would act or what would be their role. Kennedy 
fulfilled this need by explaining: 
I hold a constitutional office of tbe United States 
Government, and I shall perform the duty I have 
sworn to undertake . . we will not make or interpret 
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the laws. We shall enforce them vigorously, without 
regional bias or political slant . we will not 
pCH·secuLe. We wi 11 prosecu te. 14 
This response served 
DepartmenL actions. 
in time of despair: 
to condiLion the audience for future Justice 
He fulfilled another need by offering hope 
For on this generation of Americans falls the full 
burden of proving to the world that we really mean 
it when we say all men al'e created free and equal 
before the law. All of us might wish at times that 
we lived in a more tranquil world, but we don't. 
And if our times are difficult and perplexing, so 
are they challenging and filled with opportunity.15 
He skillfully employed his brother's much used aphorism "every 
danger is an opportunity."16 During a crisis situation, hope 
stands as a unify ing force. Kennedy's attempt to pass this 
hope along Lo his audience elicited positive responses. University 
of Georgia sLudent Charlayne Hunter represented the Atlanta 
Inquirer and was the only Negro pr esent. In an interview with 
Thomas Hopkin s in September of 1962, she said that "the memory 
01 the AtLorney General's speech gave her courage to continue 
during periods of discouragement."l? The Rev. Martin Luther King, 
Jr., praised the speech as "a symbol the White South needs today."IB 
Not only was this an offer of hope to blacks, but to every American 
who believed in justice before the law. He offered this hope in 
the 10rm of challenges and opportunities that could result from 
the situat ion. 
Most interesting of Kennedy ' s psychological appeals was his 
referral to the famous Georg~n Henry Grady who also had talked 
about liberty and respect for the law. It is not ironic that he 
would have chosen such a person to quote. No doubt, this was 
another psychological ploy to gain acceptance from his audience. 
Grady was the first southerner to ever speak before the prestigious 
New England Society in New York. Kennedy was the first high 
ranking official to speak about civil rights in the South. Some 
seventy years prior to Kennedy ' s speak ing engagement, Grady coined 
the phrase "The New South" and gave his last formal address on 
the subject when speaking in Kennedy ' s home state of Massachusetts. 
Kennedy delivered his first civil rights speech in Grady's hometown 
of Athens, Georgia . There are other interesting similarities between 
the two. Both spokesmen of human liberty had attended the 
University of Virginia; Kennedy graduated from the Law School, 
while Grady completed a year of graduate study. Both were of 
Irish descent and both died in the prime of their lives ---
Kennedy at age 42, Grady at age 39 . During their lifetimes and 
after, both represented a cause and symbolized a new spirit. 
Each envisaged a brighter future for the people of this country. 
Whether planned or not, Kennedy's text followed the same 
pattern as Grady's "New South" speech. Like Grady, Kennedy 
opened his speech on a humorous note but spoke seriously of the 
matter at hand for the remainder of the time. "He spoke wi th a 
directness, a simplicity, and a depth of feeling. ."19 says 
Marvin Bauer of Grady. The same could be said of Kennedy. 
Both alluded to the hope of "a common brotherhood for the 
American people." Bauer says Grady realized the need for the 
cultivation of an attitude. 20 Perhaps Kennedy also realized 
this --- an attitude of respect for the law as well as for all 
human beings regardless of race, color or creed. 
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Whether or not Kennedy developed his entire text around 
Grady's is unknown. Certainly he was aware of the factors 
contributing to Grady's success since he employed similar ones. 
According to a University of Georgia professor, "it was a stroke 
of genius"21 to quote Grady, especially in his hometown of Athens. 
Kennedy closed his speech by reminding the audience that one of 
their own had also declared that America stood for human liberty. 
Placement of that quotation is also significant. It was in the 
closing that Kennedy quoted from Grady's speech. Thus he left 
his audience with something to think about. He summarized the 
major theme of his address by using the words of one already held 
in high esteem by his audience . An application of Osgood and 
Tannebaum's congruity theory would allow one to assume that 
he enhanced his own ethos by this gesture. 
Also noteworthy in the speech is Kennedy ' s use of language. 
Throughout the text, he used short, direct and clear statements . 
"Our position is quite clear," he said. "We are upholding the 
law. "22 According to educator Richard Neistadt, "Bob much more 
tha n Jack, had his drive to the direct approach."23 This 
situation proved to be no exception, and his audience seemed 
appreciative of this calculated gesture. "Never before, in all 
its travail of by-gone years, has the South heard so honest and 
u nderstandable a speech from any Cabinet member," observed 
Ralph McGill, publisher of the Atlanta Journal and Constitution. 24 
The Philadelphia Inquirer referred to it as a "nota hIe speech 
because of what he sal.d and where he said it . ,,25 The New York 
Times went even further by saying "Mr Kennedy ' s text used firm 
language and his voice was even firmer as he delivered it."26 
The following excerpt is an example of this firmness . 
. in all cases --- I say to you today that if 
the orders of the court are circumvented, the 
Department of Justice will act. We will not 
stand by or be aloof . We will move . 27 
It was his intention in the May 6th speech to make public his 
approach to the civil rights problem. It would be important to 
avoid confusing and ambiguous terms that could be misinterpreted. 
Flowery, vague, or perplexing language would have served only 
as a deterrent. There is evidence that Kennedy was awa re of 
this fact. He spent the entire day before the speech go i ng 
over it word by word, trying to predict the reaction to each 
word and phrase until he was satisfied that every word conveyed 
exactly the meaning he intended. 28 Undoubtedly, he realized 
the importance of saying the "right thing in the right way at 
the right time and place." 
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The final factor put forth to determine a speech or speaker ' s 
success is whether or not one ' s efforts result in positive action. 
It is for this reason more than any other that Ken nedy's speech 
was a success. Just as he had promised, the Justice Department 
moved; they did not stand aloof when crisis situations arose. 
There is little doubt that his "blueprint" eventually was put 
into action. Only weeks after the speech was given, federal 
agents began investigating civil rights complai nts; public 
schools began initiating desegregation , and t h e federal govern -
me nt as a whole became more attentive to t he prob l em at hand . 
These actions did not come as a result of Kennedy ' s speech, yet 
his words served to forewarn or condition his audience for these 
events. The Attorney General ' s wor ds offered encouragement and 
strengthened the wil l to advocate a cha nge for t hose who saw 
discrimination as an inj ust i ce of the l a w. Th e we ll-known 
Freedom Rides resu lted from those courageous en oug h to pu rsu e 
the i r aims. Beca use of t he press ure o f those in c ide nts, he arin gs 
began on Au gust 1 of the same year; on September 1 t he dec i s i on 
was made t hat, on Oct ober 1, all seat ing in buses wo uld be 
without reference to race, col or or creed , a nd t hat all carri er s 
would have to have t hat s i gn in t he i r buses. In a ll t e rm i nals 
the "colored" an d "whi te" s igns ha d to c ome down f r om a bove t he 
fountai ns a nd restrooms . 29 The n ext summer fe dera l governme nt 
inter ve ne d aga in to "en f or c e ci vil rights sta t utes " as Ke nn e dy 
ha d prom ised. Viol e nt protes t s ar ose wh e n a youn g blac k na me d 
J a mes Meredi th tri e d t o e nter t he Uni versi ty of Mississ ippi 
in Oxford, Mi s siss ippi . Accor di ng t o Meredi t h , "Bobby Ke nn edy 
was th e ma in ma n in de t erminin g that th e s e steps be ta k e n . 
Ha d t hey n o t ma d e t he dec isions th ey ma d e, th e course of my 
life would have bee n di ffe r e nt. Hi s dec isions kept me al i ve .,,3 0 
Bobby Ke nn e dy , in t he name of t~ f e de ral gove rnm e nt, inter-
v e ne d a ga in and aga i n --- when Martin Luther Kin g wa s j ail e d , 
when Birmin g ham police unlea shed dogs on Ne gro demons t ra t or s , 
and wh e n v iole n t rac i a l r iots e rupt e d in ma jor c i t i e s a cross 
th e c ou ntr y . Ke nn e d y ' s p l e dg e t o uphold the law became evide nt. 
He wen t so far as to visit t he s c e nes of dis r u p tion in Birmingham 
a nd Miss i ss ippi. By s ubme r g ing himse l f into t he issue , Ke nn e dy 
wa s a ble t o become mor e s ympath e ti c and sensitive to the civil 
right s cause . His c on cern and l e ade rship dur i ng those incidents 
became e ve n mor e a ppare n t as h e worke d throu gh the legislative 
s yst e m. With his he lp a nd prodding , along with President 
John s on' s a nd othe rs, mor e prog r e ssive legislation in the area 
of c i vil rig hts wa s passed in t he mid-1960's than in all previous 
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years combined . Years of strife were to continlle whic)) eventually 
reslllted in the death of Kennedy in June of 1968. Had he not been 
so vigilant by offering his "why not" approach, the cOllntry might 
have moved even slower. Undoubtedly, one man alone cannot be 
given credit for the moral revolution this country witnessed 
the past decade, especially since civil rights is still an acute 
problem eleven years later. But had he not "dreamed things 
that never were," we might not have been able to experience much 
of the progress made thus far. 
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THE ELECTION DISPUTE OF 1876 
During the Gilded Age many of the attitudes toward politics 
and politicians seemed to be those of contempt and distrust. 
Much of the populace considered those who worked in this ignomin-
ious profession of politics to be in the same category with 
crooks, swindlers and the vultures who controlled big businesses. 
These judgements were not without some foundation as illustrated 
in the 1876 Presidential election. 
The Presidential election of 1876 commenced and proceeded 
like most national elections; but before a winner would be 
declared, it was destined to be the most controversial and 
complicated election in United States history. The candidates 
involved in this magnificent display of corruption and rascality 
were Republican Rutherford B. Hayes and his Democratic opponent, 
Samuel J. Tilden.l Rutherford B. Hayes, "the Great Unknown," 
was nominated by the Republicans because he had not been blemished 
by the scandals which marked Grant's administration . 2 In con-
trast, Samuel Tilden was nominated by the Democrats because he 
had a reputa tion as a reformer. 3 Although the ca ndida tes were 
very different, the platforms or issues on which they ran were 
quite similar. Both parties were guilty of using mudslinging 
tactics wi th demagoguery as the ch i ef campaign tool. 4 
It was a "dirty" campaign, but this was to be expected 
because both parties were desperate--the Republica ns were in 
power and they wanted to stay in power; the Democrats, espec ially 
in the South, were determined to regain power and ostraci ze the 
so-called carpetbaggers and "Negro-lovers." The "machines" 
in both parties obviously fe lt the end justified the mea ns, 
as illustrated by their campaign tactics in the Southern states . 
The Democrats intended to win by ignoring the laws and the 
Constitution concerning Negro suffrage. In effect, they would 
continue utili z ing the age-old technique of intimidation . Th e 
Republicans intended , if necessary, to win by using--or abusing--
the law on rejecting votes . Esse ntially this law allowed votes 
to be rejected on the grounds that intim i dation was used. Thus 
the Republicans could use the returning boards to their advantage 
and ex pect federal protection in the process . 5 
In the bitter struggle for the Presidency of 1876, both Hayes 
and Tilden gave no speeches themselves; instead, they let other 
people do their campaigning, which, of course, made any illegal 
activities by their parties much easier. 6 The two parties were 
very evenly divided, so a close e lection was predicted. 7 
Brady Ke lle ms 
Corruption was evidently expected because President Grant 
approved the increase of federal troops in Louisiana, South 
Carolina, and Florida to protect Negro suffrage, and in effect, 
gain support for the Republicans. S 
After the polls had closed on the evening of November 7, 
Tilden and his running mate, Hendricks, seemingly had won the 
election by a landslide. Tilden had quickly amassed a large 
majority of the popular vote and had a substantial lead in the 
Electoral College. 9 The next day newspapers across the country 
announced Tilden victorious in the Presidential election--
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even Hayes, himself, conceded defeat. lO But many strong, "hard-
headed" Republicans were not ready to concede defeat because 
four states--Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina, and Oregon--
had not sent in their electoral certificates and the Republicans 
controlled the political machinery in the three SouLhern states. ll 
The Republicans in their search for some type of support, some 
change in the election returns, some indication that Hayes might 
have a chance to win, received at The New York Times' office a 
dispatch from Dan Magone, chairman of the New York State 
Democratic Committee, containing the following inquiry: "Please 
give your estimate of the elecLoral votes secured for Tilden. 
Answer at once."12 This simple inquiry suggested Lhat the Demo-
crats were still uncertain about the election. The Republican 
party leaders seized this opportunity immediately and within a 
few hours Zach Chandler, chairman of the Republican National 
Committee, sent a telegram Lo Republican party leaders in 
Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana telling them "Hayes is 
elected if we have carried South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana. 
Can you hold your state? Answer at once. ,,13 The Republicans 
knew the only chance they had was to claim the election first 
and substantiate the claim afterward. 14 So when Chandler's 
reply came from the contested states, he announced: 
has 185 electoral votes and is elected. "15 
"Hayes 
Tbis statement set off a chain of events within both parties. 
Abram S. Hewitt, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 
sent leading men - -Republicans as well as Democrats--to South 
Carolina, Florida and Louisiana to see that a fair count was made, 
and the returns honestly canvassed. 16 The next day President 
Grant requested leading Republicans only to go to the disputed 
states; therefore ... two sets oi "visiting statesmen" went to the 
states in doubt. lf Although the superficial reason these 
Republican "visiting statesmen" went to the disputed sLates was 
to assure the lega Ii ty, they were in ef fect, to promo Le the 
illegality of the returning boards in order to benefit their 
party.18 Consequently, all four states--Louisiana, Florida, 
South Carolina and Oregon--submitted two sets of electoral 
returns, one by the Republicans and one by the Democrats. 19 
The dispute over the Oregon electoral votes stemmed from 
a technicality. One of the Republican electors held a small 
postmastership, which disqualified him und er th e federal Con-
st itution.2D In the dispute over the e l ectora l votes of the 
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four states both parties were accusing the other of wrongdoings. 
It i s interes ting to not e that in the Southern states the two 
major part i es, rather than denying that they had cheated, were 
justifying what they were doin g by pointing out the uns c rupulous 
acts of the other. 21 Therefore, power rather tha n math ematics 
was to decide this elect ion. A contest a fter the contest, a test 
of party strength--this was the meaning of the Hayes -Tilde n 
e l ection dis pute of 1876. 22 Wh e n the election came down to the 
wire, it depended on which of the two sets of returns would be 
accepted flom the three disputed states: Florida, South Carolina, 
a nd Louisiana. But how was the dispute to be settled? 
On December 6, th e Electoral College awarded the di s puted 
votes to Ha yes. Almost immedia t e ly the De mocrats challenged 
the returning board dec i sions on th e grounds that the Re publicans 
had us e d fraudulent me thods to attain th e votes. 23 Basically 
th e s itua t i on was: Both parties maintained that their set of 
electoral returns were t he l egitimate cert ificates; th e refore, both 
parti es c l aimed victory. Eventually the two parties came to a 
deadlock in the dispute. 
However, the American people were tire d of the dispute and 
wanted an en d to it. Only twe lve years had passed since the 
Civil War and they wer e not ready for another on e . 24 The Con-
stitution gave the President of the Senate th e power to open 
tbe certificates, in the presence of the Senate and Hous e of 
Re pr esentatives , and to count the votes. 25 But what if there 
were more than on e certificate from a state? Th e Constitution, 
implicit as it is, gave no specific g uidelines on th e subject. 
Therefore, how was th e dispute to be settled? 
Naturally both parties offered resolutions. The Republicans 
maintained the decision rests in the Supreme Court. This method 
was clearly th e most ex pe ditious from a legalistic standpoint, 
but it was also the most beneficial to the Republicans since 
the majority of the Supreme Court members were Re publicans. 
The Democrats held the d ec ision was l ega lly in the two houses 
of Congress. Since th e Democrats controlled the house, this would 
probably give the e lection to Tilden. 26 Finally, in January, 
1877, Congress appointed an Electora l Commission to decide which 
votes should go to Tilden and which for Hayes. 27 The Commission 
would be composed of fifteen members: five Senators, five 
Representatives an d five Supreme Court Justices . 28 The Commission 
would have seven Re publicans, seven Democrats and one Independent; 
but during the de bate in Congress over the Electoral Count Act 
the one Indepe nd e nt, Justice David Davis, was elected to the 
Senate. 29 So Joseph P. Bradley, a Republican, was appointed as 
the fifth Justice to serve on the Commission, thus giving the 
Republicans an eight to seven majority.3D Consequently, all 
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four of the disputed states were awarded to Hayes by a vote of 
eight to seven. 31 The Democrats, of course, would not accept 
this and threatened to use a filibuster to prevent the conp letion 
of the electoral count. 
Finally, on February 26 and 27 a series of secret conferences 
were held between Southern Democrats and representatives for 
Hayes. 32 The "Wormley House Bargain" superficially stated that 
the Republicans would officially end Reconstruction in the South 
and in return the Democrats would support Hayes' administration. 33 
But the inner arrangements had the following stipulations: with-
drawal of federal troops from the South, which in effect would 
return the Democrats to power in their states; aid for internal 
improvements; a federal subsidy for the Texas and Pacific Railway, 
which would connect the South with the West and enhance economical 
growth; and at least one Cabinet seat in the Hayes' administration. 
In return the Southern Democrats would make sure enough Democrats 
were absent from the new meeting of Congress to allow the 
Republicans to organize the House and elect a Hayes spokesman, 
James Garfield, as Speaker; also they would abstain from a 
filibuster, which would give the Presidency to Hayes. 34 In the 
end Rutherford B. Hayes defeated Samuel Tilden by a majority of 
one electoral vote (185-184). On March 2, 1877, just 56 hours 
before Inauguration Day, Hayes was formally announced as winner 
of the election. 35 
The election dispute of 1876 was caused by corruption and 
rascality within and without the political system. Hayes and 
Tilden were probably scrupulous men, in so far as politicians 
are allowed to be scrupulous. They were morally helpless and 
were really nothing more than tools manipulated by their parties. 
The methods of attaining or retaining the Presidency had little 
to do directly with Hayes or Tilden. But indirectly both were 
involved. 36 Most historians now believe that the states of 
Louisiana and Florida were carried by Tilden, but when one 
considers the intimidation employed by the Democrats and the 
fraudulent actions of the Republicans, the electoral controversy 
can still be disputed. 
It is the opinion of this researcher that Hayes was the 
best possible choice between the two candidates. If Tilden had 
won, it would have postponed business prosperity and industrial 
progression in that immigration would have been prevented. 
Furthermore, a Democratic victory would have been detrimental 
to Negro suffrage . It is doubtful that Tilden would have gone 
against the tide of his party to unleash the invisible chains 
on Negro rights. As far as the corruption goes both parties 
were guilty to some extent. The corruption in the electoral 
system in 1876 dealt a heavy blow to both parties, and in general, 
to the American political system itself. The climax of the 
Hayes-Tilden election of 1876 was the electoral dispute, but the 
significance was that it brought an end to the sectional power 
struggle and produced a more unified nation . 37 
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I. A. J. P. TAYLOR: GADFLY HISTORIAN 
Contemporary historians have the same problem that con-
temporary artists have always had; everyone knows they are here, 
but nobody wants to admit their worth. This is especially true 
for those would-be maverick historians that refuse to tote and 
lift on the commands of the profession's establishment. 
Alan John Percivale Taylor was born on March 25, 1906, the 
only son of a well-to-do Radical-Liberal cotton manufacturer 
in Southport, Lancashire, England. l His early education was 
spent in the solemn atmosphere of a Quaker school in York, where 
he was a good, if not always model, student. From these sur-
roundings Taylor gained admittance to Oriel College, Oxford, 
where he prided himself for being the entire college's only 
Labour club member. 2 
Upon Taylor's 1927 graduation with a B. A. in history 
(accomplished with First Class Honours) he set out for Vienna 
to study diplomatic history under the tutelege of A. F. Pribram. 
In 1930, still only twenty-four years old, Taylor accepted the 
position of lecturer in modern history at Manchester. 3 Taylor, 
who secured his Master's degree in 1932, remained at Manchester 
until 1938 when he was appointed as a Fellow of Magdalen College, 
Oxford and became a well-received lecturer in international 
history. Though he has never been awarded a university chair, 
A. J. P. Taylor has been Ford's lecturer in English history, 
1955-56; Leslie Stephens' lecturer, Cambridge, 1961-62; and in 
1956 was elected to the British Academy.4 
Taylor is a lover of music, wine, food, and old buildings. 5 
He is a superb television performer, often appearing on t~e B.B . C. 
broadcasts of Brains Trust and Free Speech (even though he' · 
despises the broadcasting corporat10n and calls public television 
"cultural dictatorship").6 Taylor's outspoken leftist views are 
well known in England, owing to his notoriety as an uninhibited 
columnist, a flare that cost him a full professorship at London 
University when he refused to trade in his journalism for the 
chair. 7 It would not have been the best trade possible, for by 
his own admission he makes substantially more money from jour-
nalism than he does from teaching or writing history.8 
And what of Taylor's writing of history? That it sells 
is no secret, but why it sells is somewhat mystifying to many 
of his critical colleagues. It would do them well to take more 
Mark Lega 
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110tice 01 the Taylor-style (at least on this point). One 
reviewel' recently remarked that Taylor had never been known 
to usc a superIluous word or "write an inelegant sentence.,,9 
Others have noted his "vigorous prose"lO and " relent l ess staccato 
01 short sentences ."ll Taylor celtainly owns and uses his 
consummate writ1ng skills to their full advantages. Numerous 
re1 rences are available concerning his liveliness, wit, clarity 
01 narrative, and idiosyncratic charm. In 1955, in an anonymous 
New Yorker review of Struggle For Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, 
it was written that, "Perhaps not S1nce G1bbon ha s a descent into 
the maelstrom been chronicled with so much style and wit."12 It 
is a distinctive style, and one that has so far endured numerous 
hostile reactions from some quarters. It is what makes A . J. P. 
Taylor more readable than ninety-nine percent of his contemporaries; 
it is as Hugh Brogan calls it, "the Taylor sparkle. ,,13 
If Taylor's professional colleagues all agree o n the 
readability of his history, there is a divergence 01 opinion 
concerning the advisability of reading it seriously. It has 
been noted that Taylor is a meticulous researcher, especia lly 
concerning his works Struggle For Mastery in Europe and more 
recently Beaverbrook . 14 He is never faulted for taking sim-
plistic views and i s much praised [or his f r esh ness of approach. 
It is this freshness that has at times led to conflicts with 
his contemporar i es . 
Tile reviews of his work Politics in Wartime and Other Essays 
are illustrative of this point. George Lichthe im in New Statesman 
wrote about the contents being Silly and (when in regard to 
Hitler) perverse. 15 F. H. Hinsl ey on the New York Review of 
Books regards Taylor as "deficient in the historical imagination."16 
Yet at this same time P. W. Filby in Library Journal de lights in 
Taylor's "history with a smile."17 Newsweek described Taylor's 
work as "vigorous. . with color, cogency and a kind of acid and 
grumbling c harm."18 
It seems, as Edward Segal has written, that Taylor has won 
respect lor his brilliance and originality while provoking 
indignation at those alleged vices of too much wit and too great 
a penchant for s tartling statements . 19 Perhaps Taylor extrac ts 
too great a proportion of irony and humor where the more 
professional historian sees conspiracy and drama? What is it 
that so irritates his crit ics? How is he seen by them? What 
are his answers? 
A. J. P. Taylor offers no formulas, but he does assert 
that there are permanent regulations in history. Throughout 
his works one reads phrases like "the logic of events" and "by 
an in evitab l e 10g ic.,,20 He has written that: 
Certainly. 
these laws 
flows into 
linally to 
.history has its own logical laws. But 
resemble rather those by which llood-water 
hitherto unseen channels and forces itself 
an unpredictable sea. 21 
Notice that Taylor lays no claim to realizing historical 
logic, but only that it exists. Eigbt years after having 
written the above passage Taylor remained of the same mind; in 
a letter to Ved Mehta he wrote, "I have no theories 01 history 
and I know nothing of them."22 
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If. R. Trevor-Roper has claimed that Taylor is "not noted 
for consistency. "23 It is a charge that could be hurled at 
Taylor's critics, Trevor-Roper not excluded. In English History 
1914-1945 Taylor made it clear that he believed that the people 
are better than the governors and that the besL politicians are 
those that identify with the people, that the people's enemies 
are civil servants, intellectuals, and capitalists. 24 Yet 
Trevor-Roper can write that Taylor "does not believe that human 
agents matter much in history.,,25 Indeed? Taylor is no doubt 
a democrat with a deep faith in the ultimate good sense of the 
people. 26 
This faith has led to the labeling of Taylor as the English 
populist historian, and led him to be criticized for making 
Chaplin more relevant in the inter-war years than Virginia 
Woolf. 27 Taylor does not deny the indictment. He is first a 
concerned citizen and secondly a historian. On this he has said 
that however professionally dedicated, the historian "remains 
primarily a citizen . To turn from political responsibility to 
dedica tion is to open the door to tyranny and measurable barbarism. ,,28 
The acceptance of responsibility would seem to be laudable, 
even to academics that perform their tasks in hollow libraries 
behind dirty manuscripts. The problem for Taylor and his critics 
is that he assumes responsibility for the present and refuses 
the professional responsibility of confirming consensus evaluation. 
In reply Taylor says: 
tHistoriansJ have to state the truth as they see it 
without worrying whether it shocks or confirms 
existing prejudices. Maybe 1 assumed this too 
innocently. . I do not come to history as a judge. 29 
In addition to his refusal to bow before the consensus 
opinion of his counterparts, Taylor goes one step farther . He 
refuses to even start from the pOSition that the consensus is 
correct. What has been called intellectual frivolity smacks 
of determination to defy the would-be historian's hierarchy 
until proven wrong. Taylor refuses to become sterile in his 
studies. "There is," writes Taylor, "nothing more agreeable 
than to make peace with the Establishment, and nothing more 
corrupting. "30 
Taylor's rebelliousness places his view of history at odds 
with Western (and especially British) culture. For men of the 
West are confident that constitutional order, pragmatic convention, 
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and the rule of law are all important. Th e brash and the deviant, 
s uch as Taylor and his views, are held at arm's l e ngth and ignored 
lest they upset the balance--all the more reason f or effic i ent 
his torians to read him. 
II. CRITICISM OF THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
AND TAYLOR'S DEFENSE 
In 1961 the most cont rovers ial of A. J. P. Ta y lor's books 
appeared. I t was attacked mightily by prominent me n who saw, or 
thought they saw, an absolution of Hi t l er within its pages. 
First some of the critics and then Mr. Taylor's defens e of h i s 
work. 
F. H. Soward in Canadian Forum: "The author goes to the. 
extreme to g ive Hitler the benef1t of the doubt and to flay his 
opponents. "31 And Rober t Spencer in Canadian Historical Review 
detects "factual errors , mis-statements c oncern1 ng H1tl e r's 
policy, apparent contradiction , misuse of ev ide nce, and es pecially 
a complete distortion of the personality of Hitler."32 
Many America n rev i ewers were l ess kind. S. W. Halper in 
in the Chicago Sunday Tribune a cc us e d Taylor of giving comfort 
to the neo- Na z is and "the forc es of evil everywh e r e. " This in 
addition to questioning the integr ity of the author's r e search. 33 
E. S. Pisko writing for the Christian Science Monitor noted what 
he thought to be a juggli ng of facts in a " grotesque attempt to 
stand history on its head. .he has been writing about a Hitler 
who never existed. ,,34 G. A. Craig also saw value in the book 
for those who would "r eha bilitat e the Fu e hrer 's reputation," 
and sighs that "one almost regrets having to note that its 
brilliance is exceeded by its perverseness."35 
James Joll , writing for Spectator admonishes the reader to 
be leary ; tha t whatever he reads, H1 tIer was too "more wicked. . . 
in principle and doctrine than any other contemporary statesman. ,,36 
A. L. Rouse is especially damning . Rowse condemns Taylor as 
being irresponsible in scholarship and judgment, and warns th e 
reader that the book is "flawed from top to bottom and offers an 
exemplary instance Lof.} how history should not be written.,,37 
On a mor e specific level, Raymond Sontag in the American 
Histori ca l Re vi e w takes pains to show how Taylor has manipulated 
evidence in r ega rds to the fall of Prague in Spring , 1939. 38 
Edward Segel in 1964 in Rev i e w of Politics charges Taylor on 
two counts, firs~ that h e lacks respect for sources other than 
diplomatic; and second, that within the documents he goes to, 
he is highly selective. Segel makes a stroog argument against 
Taylor for dismissing Hitler's antics as play-acting. 39 
Time magazin e, not missing a beat in its rol e as the 
establishment newsweekly, draws the weak conclusion that even 
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"Taylor states the case for appeasing Hitler and for resisting 
him. . his sympathies obviously lie with the appeasers. ,,40 Less 
scathingly, and more diplomatically, Harry Pitt of the University 
of South Carolina has said, "It's completely wrong, but you can ' t 
prove it .. "41 
The most interesting attacks came from fellow Oxford don, 
H. R. Trevor-Roper. On the heals of the book's publication , 
Trevor-Roper wrote a biting eight-page review in the July, 1961 
issue of Encounter. Within that review Trevor-Roper attacked 
Taylor for everything from arrogance to sloppy research to 
Khrushchev's belligerence towards the West. 42 
This attack was too much for Taylor and in September's 
Encounter he replied, ending his remarks by noting that "the 
Regins Professor's methods of quotation might ... do harm to his 
reputation as a serious historian, if he had one."43 To which 
Trevor-Roper took the next two pages in order to answer, "I am 
unmoved."44 The contest spread to other journals and included a 
standoff television debate. 45 
Lest a false impression be given, note that A. J. P. Taylor 
was not without some defenders. H. E. Barnes wrote in May, 
1962 that Origins was "notable and salutary" for provoking 
thought concerning the circumstances leading to the Second World 
War. Barnes noted also something that the book's critics seem 
to forget; Taylor's reputation (well known until 1961) as a most 
consistent and unabashed Germanophobe. It was this, said Barnes, 
tha t lends the work's revisionism strengths. "This fact. . . 
would seem to reflect integrity and courage rather than past 
phobias and partisanship.,,<i6 
Herbert Butterfield, author of The Whig Interpretation of 
History told Ved Mehta that: 
LOrigin~ represents a later stage in the develop-
ment of historiography--namely the very difficult 
point where one begins to go over the story with-
out always having in mind the way that the story 
ended. 47 
And though it cannot be certain, Mehta believes that Lewis Namier, 
the most reputable of historians, would have sided with Taylor. 
(Mehta bases this on the long conversation he had with Namier 
shortly before the historian's death.)48 
Taylor defended himself most fully in Origins second 
edition by adding a chapter entitled "Second Thoughts." This 
chapter plus the "Preface to the American Reader" constitutes 
the bulk of Taylor's defense. 
On the question of appeasement, Taylor has replied: 
Some English critics of this book complained that 
I had "apologized" for Hitler or for the appeaser. 
Nothing could be further from my thoughts. I have 
a clear record here. I was addressing public meet-
ings against appeasement--and a very uphill work 
it was--when my critics were confining their 
activities to the seclusions of Oxford common 
rooms. 49 
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On the subject of Hitler's vindication, Taylor blasted 
those who complained that his work did such a thing . For Taylor 
this was no argument. History was not for use against the 
enemies of mankind. If the record disproves a legend, it would 
be better to blame those who perpetrated the legend as ignorant, 
rather than ignore the latest evidence. Taylor goes on to 
argue tha t destroying Hi tIer ian legends is a service to truth 
and not a vindication of whatever evil the Fuehrer caused to 
occur. 
Taylor debunks the idea of Hitler as a second Attila with 
a long-term coherent plan for enslaving Europe, or at least the 
entire eastern half of the continent . Noting that Hitler 
speculated about what he was dOing, Taylor claims that the 
record offers no proof of a plan beyond opportunism. As an 
example, Taylor points out that few believe Hitler worked out 
some elaborate plan to come to power . Does this revision vindi-
cate Hitler? No, says Taylor, it only discredits Papen and his 
associa tes. "It is. . . revisions. . . for the sake of historica 1 
truth." 
Taylor points out also that Burton Klein, an economist for 
RAND corporation backs up the "no-plan" thesis in a 1959 study. 
If Hitler had a time-table for aggression, his failure to place 
the nation on a war-footing is a puzzle. Taylor notes Klein 
has concluded that "Until the spring of 1936, rearmament was 
largely a myth."50 
Taylor goes further to draw a parallel between Hitler's 
waiting for the opportunity to seize iron-control of Germany 
and waiting for opportunities later on in international affairs. 
Taylor cites Fritz Tobias' Reichstagbrand (1962) as shooting to 
pieces the legend that has grown around the Reichstag fire. 
Hitler, says Tobias (and Taylor), was taken by surprise--and 
retreated. 
Hitler is seen as only a moderate compared to his prede-
cessors in regards to lebensraum by Taylor . This is a hard 
place to attack Taylor, because as he points out, Mein Kampf 
only devotes seven of seven hundred pages to the discuss10n . 
It should also be noted that available published writings of 
Hitler, excluding Mein Kampf, place no undue stress on this 
traditional German goal. 51 
The Taylor argument rests not on th e belief that Hitler 
was not evil, but on the absense in the diplomatic docume nts 
that he plotted his dOings on a chart or graph of some type. 
Taylor admits to Hitler's wickedness, he rejects as myth that 
Hitler controlled his own (and Europe's) destiny . 52 In anothe r 
place Ta'ylor has noted that: 
If you regard a plan as a great v1s10n , then , of 
course, Hitler did have a plan--a lunatic vision. 
But if you define plan as I do , a plan of day-to-day 
moves , then Hitler didn't have one. 53 
In a mood of reflection, after the storm o ver Origins, 
Taylor related what he felt the problem was that l e d to such 
strong dauncia tion. 
The trouble with my book may be that in a number 
of places I left my own side very weak . I tend 
to think that if I have written one or two sen-
tences ... that's enough ... 1 know I know ... 
and I know other people know ; after all , I didn't 
write my book to be read as the only book on 
the origins of the Se cond World War . 54 
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THE HARTFORD CONVENTION: THOSE "WISE MEN OF THE EAST" 
The Hartford Convention aroused great emotion for many 
years after the War of 1812. Its supporte rs considered it to be 
a convention of statesmen, attempting to save the Union from 
democratic excesses, while its critics felt it was a gathering 
of traitors, bent on destroying that same Union. In actuality , 
the Hartford Convention was the last effort of the Federalist 
Party to remain an important fac tor in national politics . 
When the War of 1812 began , New England Fe deralists refused 
to support the Madison administration's war efforts with either 
money or vocal support. As the war continued with no e nd in 
sight , the New Englanders became restless. When Congress e nacted 
an embargo in 1813 to halt the flourishing New England trade 
with the e nemy , Federalist patience ceased; and murmurings of 
rebellion b egan to run throughout th e commercial and shipping 
towns of Massachusetts. l 
The movement for a New England convention began in Massa-
chusetts, but not in Boston, as would seem like ly. According 
to Noah Webster, "The first proposals for a convention proceeded 
from the people in their primary assemblies. Not one person in 
Boston had any concern in those proposals." Instead , the 
Hampshire County town of Northampton originated the idea. Several 
of the town's leading men, unhappy with the war's progress and 
the embargo , invited a number of leading citizens from surrounding 
towns to discuss the prevailing conditions and to make their 
sentiments known to th e Massachusetts General Court. The invitation , 
dated January 5, 1814, requested a meeting on January 19 at 
Northampton "for the purpose of a free and dispassionate dis-
cussion touching our public concerns. " 2 
At this meeting, a circular letter was authorized to be 
sent to all towns in Hampdon, Franklin, and Hampshire counties. 
The letter listed several complaints against Madison's govern-
ment; they included the embargo's unconstitutionality and the 
hardships created by it, and the lack of proper r e presentation 
in Congress for the commercial states. It also suggested that 
town meetings 
"address memorials to the General Court ... petitioning 
that honorable body to propose a convention of all the 
Northern and Commercial States, ... for procurring 
such alterations in the federal constitution as will 
give the Northern States a due proportion of represen-
tation , and secure them from the future exercise of 
powers injurious to their commercial interests .... ,,3 
Raymond T. Tatum 
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This l e tter was soon spread throughout most of Massachusetts. 
Over forty towns sent memorials to the Ge neral Court requesting 
action for the ir grievances. Northampton and Hatfield asked 
that constitutional amendments favoring New England be proposed , 
either by a convention or by any suitable means. Amherst urged 
the legislatur e "to take the most vigorous and decisive measures" 
to restore peace . Newbury refused to rule out violence; "We 
calIon our State legislature to protect us in the enjoyment 
of those privileges to assert which our fathers died, and to 
defend which we profe ss ourselves ready to resist unto blood." 
Every memorial liste d th e hated embargo as a major grievance. 4 
Popular exc iteme nt had reached a level that Federalist 
leaders f ound difficult to control. In the General Court , order 
was hard to maintain when extremist F ederalists praising Great 
Britain , vili fy ing the administration, and proposing radical 
me asures, such as sec ession, were loudly applauded by the public 
galleries. Harrison Gray Otis, a Boston legislator and a Central 
Committeeman in the Federalist Party, was given the task of 
smothering the agitation, although he was, as one observer said, 
"without th e slight est taste for political martyrdom." He 
supported th e doctrine of secession in the Court chamber, but 
added that the time was not right for such an extreme action. 
With the help of other moderates~ plans for a convention were 
postponed , at least temporarily.~ 
In ea rly Fe bruary, a special committee issued a report on 
the town memorials. It r ejected a pe tition to Congress on the 
grounds that such an action was utterly futile, and stated that 
the embargo was unconstitutional and therefor e void. A New 
England Convention to propose constitutional amendments was 
approved, but it recommended that public approval be obtained 
f irst in the spring state elections. 6 
The Republican candidate for governor, Samuel Dexter, was a 
moderate Fe deralist who disapproved of the proposed convention. 
The election became a referendum on the convention. With 55 
percent of the vote going to th e Federalist, Caleb Strong , the 
convention r eceived a vote of confidence. In the legislative 
e lection held soon afterwards, Federalists gained a majority of 
204 in the lower house . 7 
The convention had been approved by the voters. But , in 
the meantime, President Madison had allowed Congress to repeal 
the embargo, dampening the popular clamor for the convention. 
With public agitation reduced, and with Otis arguing that a 
convention might harm the peace negotiations at Ghent, the party 
leadership ignored demands for an early meeting. The Generag 
Court met that summer, and took no action. All seemed calm . 
That calm was broken by the expansion of the war during the 
summer of 1814. British military engagements along the New 
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England coastline began in July; in August, Washington was burned, 
and Maine invaded, with the British occupying United States 
territory from Canada south to the Penobscot River. It was 
rumored that a British force, led by General Rowland Hill, was 
preparing to leave Britain to invade New England. Fueled by 
the deteriorating situation, demands for a separate peace and 
secession joined existing complaints over the Massachusetts 
government's inaction. Thus pressured by external invasion and 
internal rebellion, the Federalist state leaders went ahead with 
convention plans. In early September, Governor Strong ordered 
the General Court back into special session to adopt such 
measures as "the present dangerous state of public affairs may 
render expedient."g 
Before the special session began, Federalist leaders devised 
a plan of action. They had to satisfy the public, whose language 
was "high toned and menacing," according to Otis. But few wanted 
outright secession; most party leaders were moderates who still 
had hopes of regaining power in Washington. Of all the demands 
listed by the public, the convention scheme alone seemed "consti-
tutional and peaceable." To save the special session from 
indecision or from producing violent measures, leading members 
of the Federalist caucus and the Central Committee decided to 
support "the sentiments of our country friends" in fa vor of a 
convention in order to keep it from becoming too radical. lO 
A cautious, low-keyed speech by Governor Strong at the 
opening session of the General Court on October 17 was referred 
to a joint committee chaired by Otis. By careful prearrangement, 
moderates dominated this committee. The legislature received its 
report the next day. This paper, known as "Otis's Report" after 
its author, urged the state to withhold its taxes from the 
federal treasury in order to support its own defense against 
the British. It also stated that the Constitution had failed 
to provide New England with the rights and benefits expected 
from it, and therefore required immediate change. To bring about 
this change, the report proposed a convention "between those 
states the affinity of whose interests is closest" which would 
meet in Hartford, Connecticut, on December 15, 1814. This 
convention would devise a system of common defense for New 
England and would "enable delegates from those sta tes. to 
lay the foundation for a radical reform in the national compact. 
The report ended with several resolutions, one of which called 
for the appointment of delegates to the convention. ll 
Radicals tried to add several more extreme measures, but 
failed. John Lowell believed that the convention would be too 
moderate, but his was the minority view. House members did 
commit the delegation to support constitutional amendments 
rectifying abuses in slave representation and the congressional 
power to lay embargoes. 12 
" 
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On October 18 , "Otis's Report" was approved by wide margins 
in both houses--22 to 12 in the Senate and 260 to 90 in the 
House--with a number of Republican l egislators refusing to vote. 
Approval was then given to send the report and letters of 
invitation to the other New England states. 13 
The vocal minorities in both houses submitted protests 
against the convention. The Se nate protest stated "No state 
should e nt e r into any compact or agreeme nt with another without 
the consent of Congress." The House protest , signed by 75 
legislators, felt that "However disguised or designed," this 
convention would "prepare the way for a separation and division 
of the Union." The Federalist majority refused to record 
e ither protest, deeming them "disrespectful.,,14 
Wh e n the Connecticut legislatur e received its invitation, 
it was r eferr e d, as usual, to a committee . The committee report 
d enounced the Madison administration's attachment to Napolean 
and its abandonment of New England defense. It compared the 
peac e, when "our cities and villages exhibited indications of 
increas ing wealth," to existence during the war, when "the fleets 
o f a powerful e nemy hover on our coasts; blockade our harbours; 
and threaten our towns and citizens with fire and desolation." 
The committee approved of the convention, and asked that delegates 
from Connecticut be appointed to confer on those subjects pro-
posed by Massachusetts , plus "any other subj ects which may come 
before them." The Connecticut legislature approved this report 
by a vote of 153 to 36. 15 
The Rhode Island legislative committee that handled the 
Massachusetts invitation confined itself to a discussion of the 
military situation and the federal government's failure to 
protect the state. It asked that delegates b e sent to confer on 
"the best means of co-operating for our mutual defense" and on 
the best way of restoring the people's "rights and privileges" 
under the Constitution. The vote in the assembly was 39 to 28 in 
favor; as in Massachusetts, a Republican protest was not entered 
into the records. 16 
New Hampshire and Vermont did not approve of the convention 
as expected. In New Hampshire, a combination of the legislature's 
adjournment, Republican control of the governor's council, and 
indifference on the part of most Federalist leaders made formal 
participation impossible. However, party organizations in two 
counties along the Connecticut River went ahead and appointed a 
couple of delegates to the convention. The British invasion of 
Lake Champlain during the summer had put an end to partisan 
bickering in Vermont. The Federalist governor there believed 
that the war was a defensive one now, and should be supported by 
everyone. The Federalist-controlled legislature rejected the 
invitation unanimously. But, as in New Hampshire, one county 
sent its own delegate. 17 The abstention of Vermont and New 
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Hampshire, plus the presence of vocal minorities in Massachusetts 
and Rhode Island, weakened the c onvention, because it showed that 
not even New England was united behind it . 
Advice, much of it conflicting, soon descended on the con-
vention delegates. Gouverneur Morris urged them to support an 
autonomous New England confederacy , while Thomas Pickering, a 
prominent Federalist extremist, wanted the West forced out of 
the Union, restoring the eastern commercial states to the pre-
eminence that they had once enjoyed. Lowell wanted the 
Constitution suspended and New England declared neutral for the 
remainder of the war. At the same time, moderation was urged 
by others, Robert Goodloe Harper of Baltimore warned that southern 
Federalists would not tolerate New England obstructionism. A 
couple of middle-state Federalists argued against the convention; 
Oliver Wolcott believed it to be unconstitutional, while Rufus 
King feared that it might, horror of horrors, satisfy public 
opinion. 18 
The delegates to the Hartford Convention had a good deal of 
pressure placed on their shoulders. They numbered 26 and 
represented the political and legal expertise of New England 
Federalism. All were political activists and leaders of their 
communities. Twenty-one were lawyers, with the remainder 
merchants; twenty-two were college graduates, and nine had served 
as judges. The average age was 52. They were mature and 
responsible men, not the sort to risk both neck and property in 
an abortive rebellion. 19 
Massachusetts sent the largest delegation: twelve. George 
Cabot, a founder of the Federalist Party and a former United 
States Senator from Massachusetts, had stepped out of retirement 
to head the delegation. He distrusted democracy, but had 
mellowed with years and served as a restraining influence at the 
convention . His presence in the delegation did not please 
extremist Federalists at all; both Pickering and Lowell saw Cabot 
as a man "most reluctantly dragged in like a conscript to the 
duty of a delegate." He was skeptical of human nature, asking a 
friend once, "Why can't you and I let the world ruin itself its 
own way?" He became a delegate, he said, "to keep you young 
hotheads from getting into mischief." Cabot was clearly not a 
maker of revolutions. 20 
Most other Massachusetts delegates were also moderates. 
Harrison Gray Otis had led the moderates in the General Court, 
and proved to be a moderate influence at Hartford. A successful 
lawyer and the bearer of a distinguished Massachusetts name, Otis 
was an eloquent speaker and possessed great charm. Joseph Lyman, 
a leading figure at the Northampton meetings in January, 1814, 
was a delegate, as was Timothy Bigelow, the speaker of the 
Massachusetts House. Nathan Dane, the author of the 1787 North-
west Ordinance, Stephen Longfellow, father of the poet, and 
r 
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William Prescott, father of the historian, also attended. Joshua 
Thomas, Samuel Sumner Wilde, George Bliss, Daniel Waldo , and 
Hodijah Baylies rounded out the list . All but Bigelow and Bliss 
were considered moderates. 21 
The Connecticut delegation was l e d by Lieutenant-Governor 
Chauncey Goodrich, a veteran congressman and one-time major of 
Hartford. James Hillhouse was treasure r of Yale; he had fought 
in the Revolution, and had served in Congress for 20 years. The 
oldest delegate at Hartford was John Treadwell, who had served 
in the Continental Congress and both houses of the Connecticut 
legislature, and had been both governor and lieutenant-governor 
of Connecticut. Zephaniah Swift and Nathaniel Smith had served 
in Congr ess, and were now the chief justice and an associate 
justice, respectively, of the state Supreme Court . Calvin 
Goddard had spent four years in Congress and 17 years as major of 
Norwich, and was appointed to the state Supreme Court shortly 
after the convention. Roger Minot Sherman was a reputable lawyer 
and l egislator. The Connecticut d elegation was seen as "a 
collection of sedate, temperate, serious, and ... generally 
wise men.,,22 
The Rhode Island delegation did not have as much experience 
in national politics as the other two delegations had. This can 
perhaps be explained by Rhode Island's previous disdain for 
unified state action. Daniel Lyman, Rhode Island's chief 
justice , had been a major during the Revolution, and was now the 
presiden t of the Society of the Cincinnati. Samuel Ward was the 
son of the founder of Brown University, and had fought with 
Benedict Arnold in the unsuccessful 1775 expedition against 
Quebec. Benjamin Hazard and Edward Manton were state legislators. 23 
The representative from Cheshire County, New Hampshire, 
Benjamin West, was known as a "refuser of offices." He had been 
elected to the Articles of Confederation Congress, the state 
constitutional convention, and the United States House o f Repre-
sentatives, and had refused all three. The other New Hampshire 
delegate, Miles Olcott of Grafton County, was a lawyer. William 
Hall, a merchant from Bellow Falls, Vermont, completed the list 
of convention delegates. 24 
On the morning of December 15, all but two of the delegates 
had assembled in Hartford for the opening session of the convention. 
The Connecticut State House Council Chamber had been placed at 
their disposal by the legislature. Cabot was unanimously elected 
president of the body, and Theodore Dwight, the editor of the 
Connecticut Mirror, was the unanimous choice as secretary.25 
Otis, Hillhouse, and Lyman were appointed to the credentials 
committee, which verified everyone's credentials . A rules committee, 
composed of Goddard, Bigelow, and Lyman, was then nam ed, and the 
assembly was adjourned until that afternoon. When they reconvened, 
the rules drawn up by the committee were approved. Most were 
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either trivial or inoffensive; however, the second rule gave the 
delegates a great deal of grief later on. It read, "The most 
inviolable secrecy shall be observed by each member of this 
Convention, including the Secretary, as to all propositions, 
debates, . and proceedings thereof, until this injunction shall be 
suspended or altered." The arguments for secrecy later given by 
the delegates were custom--the Constitutional Convention had met 
in private--and speed--business could be handled much faster 
without outside pressure. But with the country at war and with 
Republican distrust of the convention prevalent, secrecy was 
unwise. The public immediately assumed that the delegates were 
hiding treasonable debate. This accusation haunted the delegates 
and their work for many years. 26 
After the approval of rules, a committee of five was appointed 
to prepare a list of "proper" subjects for discussion. Goodrich, 
Otis, Daniel Lyman, Swift, and Dane were appointed. 27 
The next day, Ward arrived from Rhode Island, and was seated. 
The committee of five then submitted its report of discussion 
topics. It listed the constitutional question of militia command, 
the issue of federal reimbursement for the expenses of mobilized 
militia not under federal command, the constitutionality of 
military conscription, the general expenses of the war, and the 
matter of state defense. 28 
Two days of discussion followed. A number of delegates wanted 
to include a set of constitutional amendments, which the report 
had not mentioned. Several, such as Hillhouse and Bigelow wanted 
extremer action taken than desired by the moderates. On the 19th, 
Cabot appointed a committee to draft a set of proposals for 
adoption. The committee members were Smith, Otis, Goddard, West, 
and Hazard, with the more outspoken members pOintedly excluded. 
The next day, this committee submitted its report, which was 
similar to the December 16 report and did not include any amend-
ments. Debate went on until December 24, when the report was 
approved, but with six amendments added to the original. This 
report, with the addition of another amendment on December 29, 
was the basis for the final convention report. 29 
On December 21, a committee of seven had been appointed to 
prepare a final convention report. Otis was the chairman, and 
was joined by Smith, Sberman, Dane, Prescott, West, and Hazard. 
This committee received the adopted proposals on the 24th and went 
to work. The convention, waiting for the final draft, had little 
to do between December 26 and 30, except admit Hall of Vermont on 
the 28th. On Friday, December 30, the final report was ready for 
discussion. Examined paragraph by paragraph, the first eight 
pages were returned to the committee for revision on the 31st. 
Finally, on the afternoon of January 3, 1815, the report was 
approved by the entire convention. Wrapping up unfinished 
business, the Hartford Convention adjourned on January 5. 30 
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During the convention's meetings, public opinion had been 
greatly aroused by its secrecy. This secrecy seems to have been 
kept very strictly; other Federalists knew as little about the 
convention proceedings as the Republicans. Their hopes were high, 
though. In a letter to Pickering, Gouverneur Morris wrote that 
his "eyes are fixed on a star in the East, which . . . !he believec!7 
to be the dayspring of freedom and glory." The Boston Columbian 
Centinel, on December 28, asked the convention to free New 
England from "the tyrannical oppression" of the Republicans. 3l 
The Republican newspapers also had comments to make about 
the convention. According to the Hartford American Mercury, 
Hartford bystanders had expressions of loath1ng and d1sgust as 
the delegates assembled December 15. The American flag was dis-
played at half-mast, three meetinghouses tolled their bells 
solemnly, and "appropriate (funeral) marches" were played in the 
streets. According to the Mercury, the delegates appeared 
melancholy and fearful while walking the streets, rarely looking 
up except when passing a tree or some object from which a person 
could be hanged. 32 The Boston Patriot recommended arresting the 
delegates as traitors at the first overt act of treason, but the 
Kentucky Gazette believed that the Federalists would not put the 
government to that much trouble, calling them "fools and cowards--
and as such will never risk any other punishment than that of 
being heartily laughed at."33 
Despite the sneers, the administration worried about the 
convention and the possibility of revolt. A young Kentuckian, 
Major Thomas T. Jessup, was stationed with his regiment at 
Hartford during the convention. Officially there to recruit, he 
also had orders to watch the convention for any overt signs of 
rebellion. With his troops and New York troops under Governor 
Daniel Tompkins A the administration was prepared to crush any 
sign of revolt.~4 
The final report of the Hartford Convention was published in 
an extra of the Hartford Courant on January 6. It was soon 
reprinted by a number of newspapers including the Lexington 
Western Monitor, and as a pamphlet. 35 In its opening paragraphs, 
the report acknowledged the difficulties faced by the delegates 
in finding constitutional means of ending federal oppression and 
enacting reforms without "disappointing the hopes of a suffering 
and injured people." Reform through legitimate channels might 
seem irksome, "but when corruption existed throughout the govern-
ment, no quick means of relief existed" without recourse to 
direct and open resistance. "which should be avoided. 
Some might regard the evils surrounding them as "intrinsic and 
incurrable defects in the constitution." But the convention did 
not agree, and urged moderation for several reasons. After all, 
the Constitution had worked nicely under "a wise and virtuous" 
government--in other words, under Federalists. The existing 
troubles had been caused by the incompetence, corruption, and 
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oppression of the Republicans. Therefore, these officials should 
be replaced. "But to attempt upon every abuse of power to change 
the Constitution would be to perpetuate the evils of revolution." 
Also , tbe Napoleonic wars had misled many people into supporting 
France . . With Napoleon now conquere d, these citize ns would real ize 
that America's true interests rested with Gr eat Britain. A 
third reason for moderation was the war itself . The convention 
felt if the Union had to separate, it should be by common consent 
during peacetime, instead of violently while at war.36 
The report was phrased in suc h a way as to placate both sides. 
The extremists were encouraged to think that the Convention 
supported their views, but not their timing. Mode rates, on the 
other hand, were given the impr e ssion that the extremist viewpoint 
had been rejected. The desire to conciliate both sides and hold 
the party together was strong. 37 
The Madison administration's military policy was discussed 
next. The division of the country into military districts and 
the use of army conscription were denounced as unconstitutional. 
The delegates admitted that the president had the power to take 
command of the state militias under certain circumstances, but 
argued that the states could ignore a presidential summons if 
they wished. The states were encouraged to uphold the ir authority 
against encroachment by the national government. 38 
The report now turns to New England defense. By diverting 
manpower and supplies in a futile attempt to conquer Canada, the 
administration had "left the exposed and vulnerable parts of the 
country destitute of all the efficient means of defense." The 
lack of federal troops had forced the states to depend on their 
militias. The administration had refused to pay the expenses of 
militias not under federal control. This expense placed a 
strain on state finances, because they were paying to the federal 
treasury at the same time. Because the national government was 
on the verge of bankruptcy, New England expected little improvement 
in federal defense. Therefore, they suggested that "these states. 
be allowed to assume their own defense, by the militia or other 
tropps." To pay for this defense, "a reasonable portion" of the 
federal taxes raised in the states should be retained by them. 39 
The next two pages were basically a Federalist party manifesto. 
It is a list of Republican practices that they believe have led 
the country to ruin . The most important objection was the 
Republicans' use of "local jealousies and ambition, so as to 
secure to popular leaders in one section of the Union, the 
controul [siC<.! of public affairs in perpetual succession." 
Another objection was the exclusion of Federalists from the 
national government by the Republicans . The convention also 
disapproved of the Republicans' "unconstitutional" interference 
with the courts, their mishandling of the economy, and the use of 
patronage as a political tool. An important New England objection 
included was the destruction of "the balance of power which 
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existed among the original states" by the admission of new states. 
The convention also disliked the appointment of naturalized 
citizens to high office, the Republicans' tilt toward France at 
Great Britain's expense, and the attempt to use commerce as "an 
instrument of coercion and war. "40 
In order to correct these constitutional errors, the con-
vention proposed seven constitutional amendments, limited to 
"essential" matters. The stated object of the amendments was "to 
strengthen, and if possible to perpetuate, the union of the 
s ta tes. "The first amendment would ha ve abolished the three-
fifths compromise, and would have based direct taxes and represen-
tation in the House of Representatives--and therefore the Electoral 
College --on the number of free inhabitants in each state . The 
second "indispensable" amendment would have required a two-thirds 
vote of both houses of Congress to admit new states to the Union, 
giving the commercial, Federalist states a veto over the creation 
of new state s. The third and fourth amendments would have limited 
an embargo to 60 days, and would have required a two-thirds vote 
of Congre ss to ban commercial relations between the United States 
and another country.41 
Th e fifth amendment would have required a two-thirds vote 
of both houses of Congress for a declaration of war . The 
Federalists argued that the war had been started by the western 
states, which were not in danger of invasion or blockade, unlike 
the coastal states . A sixth amendment would have barred naturalized 
citizens from sitting in Congress or from holding any civil office 
in the government. The last amendment would have restricted a 
president to a single term of office, and would have forbidden 
the election of presidents from the same state for successive 
terms. "A president whose political career is limited to a 
single election, may find no other interest . . Lthan that ot? 
making it glorious to himself, and beneficial to his country . ,,42 
The report concluded with a number of resolutions. The 
first one recommended that the New England states adopt all 
measures needed to protect their people from unconstitutional 
acts passed by Congress. A second resolution urged these states 
to petition Congress for approval of the defense recommendations 
made by the convention, while the third recommended the creation 
of state armies. The next resolution asked that New England 
approve the amendments listed and submit them to other states 
for adoption. If Congress failed to act on the Federalist 
grievances, there should be a second New England convention, to 
be held at Boston on the third Thursday of June, 1815 . If a 
crisis should arise before then, Cabot, Goodrich, and Lyman 
were authorized to call another meeting of the delegates at 
Boston. Last of all are the delegates' signatures, with 
Massachusetts heading the list. 43 
Fe deralist reaction to the convention report was mixed. 
Pickering and Lowell considered it to be too moderate, while 
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others felt that a constitutional convention should have been 
called. Arthur Bryant of Northampton wrote his son, William 
Cullen, '~ur Federalists were much disappointed, saying that 
they dared not adopt any energetic measures, but would go on in 
the wa y of supplica tion. "But the maj ori ty of the Federa lists 
applauded the "moderate but firm" report. Governor Strong and 
Senator Gore of Massachusetts, John Jay, and Daniel Webster were 
just a few of the report's admirers. 44 In Philadelphia, the 
following toast was made at a Washington's Birthday dinner: 
"The Hartford Convention, the dignified apostles of the true 
poli tica 1 fa i th ! "45 
Republicans generally were relieved by the convention's 
moderation. The organ of the administration, the National 
Intelligencer, felt that "the proceedings are tempered with more 
moderation than was to have been expected." Several newspapers 
needled the convention delegates; the Montreal Courant and Herald 
called them "the Hucksters in Chief of the United States." The 
Kentucky Gazette seems to have summed up Republican sentiment 
nicely; "The mountain has neither bro't forth a mouse, nor 
termina ted in a volcano. "46 
By January 18, when the Massachusetts General Court met for 
its winter session, Federalist spirits had been raised con-
siderably. In his opening speech, Governor Strong praised the 
convention for preventing a "fatal excess" of extremism. The 
legislature quickly approved a resolution stating that it did 
"highly approve" the delegates' work. The Connecticut legislature 
also approved the report. But Rhode Island and New Hampshire 
took no action on it, and ten other states rejected it.47 
When the General Court approved the convention report, it 
also authorized a commission of three to go to Washington to 
arrange for the transfer of defense responsibilities from the 
federal government to Massachusetts. Harrison Gray Otis, Thomas 
H. Perkins, and William Sullivan were chosen. They left Boston 
on February 3, two days after learning of Jackson's victory at 
New Orleans, and arrived in Washington on the 13th. The very 
next day, the capital learned that the Treaty of Ghent had been 
signed on December 24, 1814. The war was over, making the 
commissioners' trip irrelevant. Ridiculed by the opposition 
press, they remained long enough to argue their claims before a 
skeptical administration, and then returned home. 48 
Connecticut had also sent a couple of commissioners, Calvin 
Goddard and Nathaniel Terry, to Washington. But they arrived 
there after news of the peace treaty had arrived, and managed 
to avoid the ridicule heaped on the Massachusetts delegates. 49 
With the war over, Republican newspapers and wits lampooned 
and satirized the Hartford Convention unmercifully. One story 
had a British officer taking a ride in the Connecticut country-
side, where he met two British deserters. Asked where they were 
" 
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going, they replied , "the Hartford Convention." Hearing this 
story, a Hartford citizen remarked, "then they lied, for the 
Hartford Convention never deserted from his majesty's service . ,,50 
The Hartford Convention was the dying gasp of the Federalist 
Party. Outside of New England, only remnants of the party 
remained. The War of 1812 had given the New England Federalists 
a new vitality, but it was only temporary, America was changing; 
Jacksonian democracy would appear in the not-so-distant future, 
and ther e was no longer room for a party of the rich and well-
born . 
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Epitaph of the Hartford Convention 
Missing. 
Three well looking, responsible men, who appear to be 
travelling towards Washington, disappeared suddenly from Gadsby's 
Hotel, in Baltimore, on Monday evening last, and hav e not since 
been heard of. They were observed to be very melancholy on 
hearing the news of peace, and one of them was hea rd to say, 
with a great sigh, "Poor Caleb Strong." They took with them 
their saddle-bags, so that no apprehension is e ntertained of 
their having an intention to make away with themselves. Whoever 
will give any information to the Hartford Convention of the fate 
of these unfortunate and tristful gentlemen by lette r (post paid) 
will confer a favor upon humanity. 
The newspapers, particularly the Federal newspapers, are 
requested to publish this advertisement in a conspicuous place, 
and send their bills to the Hartford Convention. 
P.S. One of the gentlemen was called Titus Oates, or some such 
name. LSource: the New York National AdvocateJ 
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